Abstract. The Ring Learning-With-Errors (RLWE) problem shows great promise for post-quantum cryptography and homomorphic encryption. We describe a new attack on the non-dual search RLWE problem with small error widths, using ring homomorphisms to finite fields and the chi-squared statistical test. In particular, we identify a "subfield vulnerability" (Section 5.2) and give a new attack which finds this vulnerability by mapping to a finite field extension and detecting non-uniformity with respect to the number of elements in the subfield. We use this attack to give examples of vulnerable RLWE instances in Galois number fields. We also extend the well-known search-to-decision reduction result to Galois fields with any unramified prime modulus q, regardless of the residue degree f of q, and we use this in our attacks. The time complexity of our attack is O(nq 2f ), where n is the degree of K and f is the residue degree of q in K. We also show an attack on the non-dual (resp. dual) RLWE problem with narrow error distributions in prime cyclotomic rings when the modulus is a ramified prime (resp. any integer). We demonstrate the attacks in practice by finding many vulnerable instances and successfully attacking them. We include the code for all attacks.
Introduction
The Ring Learning-with-Errors (RLWE) problem, proposed in [18] , is a variant of the Learning-with-Errors (LWE) problem, and is an active research area in lattice based cryptography, and a candidate for postquantum cryptography. It has drawn increased attention because it can be used for homomorphic encryption ( [2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 17, 24] ). The problem, which comes in search and decision variants, is based on the geometry of ideal lattices, in particular the rings of integers of number fields, or their duals.
It is of great importance to understand the security of RLWE. The first piece of the puzzle is provided by proofs of security [18] . However, it is also important to mount direct attacks on the problem and its variants, in order to illuminate the protective properties of the provably secure instances, the dangers of deviating from established parameters, and the practical runtimes for certain parameter sizes. This work is part of that programme, which has seen much recent interest, e.g. [11, 12] . An eprint version of the current paper [8] has already generated much follow-up work [6, 7, 9, 22] . In this paper we provide a brief overview of past work, and then present attacks which are novel in their mathematical underpinnings (based on new homomorphisms to finite fields of higher degree which detect in particular "subfield vulnerabilities", see Section 5.2). We also discuss the underlying number theory and geometry of these attacks to provide a framework for future work.
An instance of the RLWE problem is determined by a choice of a number field K and a prime q called the modulus, along with an error distribution. The authors of [18] proved a reduction from certain hard lattice problems to an instance of search RLWE involving a continuous Gaussian error distribution modulo the dual ideal R ∨ of the ring of integers R of K. Ducas and Durmus proposed a non-dual variant of RLWE in the cyclotomic setting and proved its hardness in [10] . Also in [18] , a search-to-decision reduction was proved for RLWE problems in cyclotomic fields and modulus q which splits completely. This reduction was then generalized in [11] to hold for general Galois number fields where q splits. As an auxiliary result in this paper, we generalize this search-to-decision reduction to work for the case of unramified modulus q of arbitrary degree.
The non-dual variant of RLWE generates the error distribution as a discrete Gaussian on the ring of integers R under the canonical embedding, instead of in the image of the dual ideal. The dual and non-dual variants are equivalent up to a change in the error distribution (see Section 2) . For the non-dual variant of RLWE, the authors of [12] proposed an attack on the decision RLWE problem. The attack makes use of a modulus q of residue degree 1, giving a ring homomorphism ρ : R → F q (so that it could be called a mod q attack, although it differs from [20, 21] ). The attack works when, with overwhelming probability, the image of the RLWE error distribution under the map ρ takes values only in a small subset of F q . The authors of [12] then gave an infinite family of examples vulnerable to the attack. Unfortunately, the vulnerable number fields in [12] are not Galois. Hence, the search-to-decision reduction theorem does not apply, and the attack can not be directly used to solve the search variant of RLWE for those instances.
In this paper, we generalize the attack of [12] to certain Galois number fields and moduli of higher degree. As a result, we have an attack on the search RLWE problem and an implementation of the attack on concrete RLWE instances, including the search-to-decision reduction. Our attack is new in two major ways: first, the attack considers ring homomorphisms from R → F q f , for f > 1, instead of just homomorphisms from R → F q (so it is no longer 'mod q'); second, the error distribution is distinguished from random (i.e. from the uniform distribution) using the statistical chi-squared test, instead of relying on the values of the error polynomial to be small or in a small subset. The attack aims at an intermediate problem used in the search-to-decision proof of [18] , which is to recover the secret modulo a prime ideal (denoted SRLWE(R, q); see Definition 7). The time complexity of our attack is O(nq 2f ), where n is the degree of K and f is the residue degree of q in K.
Importantly, we also show an attack on prime cyclotomic rings under certain assumptions on the modulus and error rate, which succeeds with high probability and with surprising efficiency. First, we give attacks for the decision version of the non-dual variant of RLWE considered in [12] , when the modulus q is equal to the unique ramified prime p. For example, we show that in dimension n = 808, we can attack an RLWE instance in the cyclotomic ring Q(ζ 809 ) effectively in 35 seconds, where the modulus is 809. This opens up the question of whether general cyclotomic fields are safe for cryptography, depending on whether modulus switching can be used to transfer this attack from the ramified modulus to other larger moduli which are used in practice. In addition, we attack the decision version of the dual RLWE problem on the p-th cyclotomic field with arbitrary modulus q, assuming that the width r of the error distribution is around
The error widths for which our attacks work are below those required by the security proof of [18] , which requires r = ω( √ log n). In particular, this work does not affect the hardness results of [18] . On the other hand, in practice, in implementations of homomorphic encryption systems based on the hardness of RLWE, it has been common practice to use small errors to improve efficiency for the systems. We show in this work that for errors in the width range below provably secure but above linear algebra vulnerable (errorless LWE), the security of RLWE depends in an interesting way on the choice of ring and modulus. To be more specific, the geometry of the ring of integers and the manner in which certain prime ideals exist as sublattices are important factors (see Section 5.2). Finally, it is important to note that most implementations of RLWEbased schemes use exclusively 2-power cyclotomic rings, on which our attacks are not effective. Hence the impact of our attacks on the security of existing practical implementations of RLWE-based homomorphic encryption schemes is limited.
Auxiliary results we present include several stand-alone items of possibly independent interest: we prove a search-to-decision reduction for Galois fields which applies for any unramified modulus q, regardless of the residue degree of q (this relies heavily on Galois theory and Galois fields are the largest class to which we expect this to apply). We also present some heuristic arguments as to whether modulus switching techniques are likely to be successfully combined with our attacks.
We end this section with a table summarizing what is known about the security of RLWE for certain choices of number fields. The first table deals with the continuous dual version. For comparison, we normalize the error width: letr = r · |d K | 1/2n , where d K is the discriminant of the number field K. 
any ∼ 1 decision is not secure (this paper)
The second table deals with the non-dual discrete version. Here we normalize byr = r/|d K | 1/2n . The heuristic expectation is that whenr = Ω( √ n) and q = poly(n), decision RLWE problem should be hard. 
search is not secure [9] 1.1 Organization
In Section 2, we review some definitions related to the RLWE problems. In Section 3, we prove a search-todecision reduction for Galois extensions K and unramified moduli. In Section 4, we introduce an attack on non-dual RLWE problems based on the chi-square statistical test, which directly generalizes the attack in [12] . In Section 5, we give examples of subfields of cyclotomic fields vulnerable to our new attack, where the modulus q has residue degree two. In Section 6, we give attacks on the non-dual RLWE in prime cyclotomic fields when the modulus is the unique ramified prime and dual RLWE for any modulus, assuming the errors are sufficiently narrow. In Section 7, we consider the possibility of combining modulus switching with our attack. All computations in this paper were performed in Sage [25] . All the relevant code is available and can be found at https://github.com/haochenuw/GaloisRLWE.
It turns out that Λ R := ι(R) is a lattice in R n . Let w = (w 1 , · · · , w n ) be an integral basis for R. The embedding matrix of w, denoted by A w , is the n-by-n matrix whose i-th column is ι(w i ). Note that the columns of A w form a basis for the lattice Λ R .
For σ > 0, define the Gaussian function ρ σ : R n → (0, 1], depending on the usual inner product on R n , to be ρ σ (x) = e −||x|| 2 /2σ
2 .
Definition 1. For a lattice Λ ⊂ R n and σ > 0, the discrete Gaussian distribution on Λ with parameter σ is:
Equivalently, the probability of sampling any lattice point x is proportional to ρ σ (x).
We follow [12] in setting up the non-dual RLWE problem for general number fields. In particular, the error distribution we use is a spherical discrete Gaussian distribution on Λ R . Definition 2. A (non-dual) RLWE instance is a tuple R = (K, q, σ, s), where K is a number field with ring of integers R, q is a prime, σ > 0 is a positive real number, and s ∈ R/qR is called the secret.
Suppose R = (K, q, σ, s) is an RLWE instance and let R be the ring of integers of K. The error distribution of R is the discrete Gaussian distribution D Λ R ,σ .
Let R q denote the quotient ring R/qR; then a (non-dual) RLWE sample is a pair
where the first coordinate a is chosen uniformly at random in R q , and e is sampled from the error distribution and considered modulo qR. The reader unfamiliar with this problem should consider this analogous to a discrete logarithm pair (g, g s ) ∈ F q × F q , where s is a secret exponent.
Definition 3 (Search RLWE). Let R be an RLWE instance. The search RLWE problem, denoted by SRLWE(R), is to discover s given access to arbitrarily many independent samples (a, b).
Definition 4 (Decision RLWE). Let R be an RLWE instance. The decision RLWE problem, denoted by DRLWE(R), is to distinguish between the same number of independent samples in two distributions on R q × R q . The first is the RLWE distribution of R, and the second consists of uniformly random and independent samples from R q × R q .
Remark 5. As pointed out in [12] , when analyzing the error distribution, one needs to take into account the sparsity of the lattice Λ R , which is measured by its covolume det(Λ R ) = | disc(K)|. In light of this, we define a relative version of the standard deviation parameter:
. Remark 6. There are different approximate algorithms to sample from discrete Gaussian distributions on lattices. In this paper, we choose to use the sampling algorithm developed in [14] .
We now discuss dual RLWE and its relation to non-dual RLWE. In dual RLWE, the secret s lies in R ∨ q := R ∨ /qR ∨ , where R ∨ is the dual ideal of R, and the error e is sampled from R ∨ with discrete spherical
Gaussian distribution with width r = √ 2πσ. Therefore the RLWE samples are of the form
The dual and non-dual versions of the RLWE problem are very closely related when the dual ideal is principal: in this case, R and R ∨ are related by a scaling factor (which may alter a spherical Gaussian to an ellipsoidal one). Even when R ∨ is not principal, we have R ⊆ k 1 R ∨ and R ∨ ⊆ k 2 R for some constants k 1 and k 2 , so that a problem in one formulation can be reduced to a problem in the other, with a different error distribution. Several of the non-dual examples of this paper are known to have principal dual ideal [22] . In particular, our attack on the ramified prime for cyclotomic fields is translated to the dual situation in Section 6.2. The full class of elliptic Gaussians (not just spherical) is also considered in the security reductions of [18] .
Finally, there is a continuous version of RLWE which is more amenable to security reductions. Since one can always discretize, the continuous version reduces to the discrete one presented here, which is more practical for applications.
Search-to-Decision Reduction
In [11] , the search-to-decision reduction of [18] is extended to RLWE for Galois number fields, where q is an unramified prime of degree one. The approach is via an intermediate problem, denoted q i -LWE in [18] . In this section, we extend this result to primes q of arbitrary residue degree. Our intermediate problem, which we denote by SRLWE(R, q), is the same as q i -LWE, and it amounts to finding the secret modulo the prime q. The Galois group allows us to bootstrap this piece of information to discover the full secret.
The attack in Section 4 targets SRLWE(R, q) and hence, by the results of this section, will solve Search RLWE. In Section 5, we demonstrate the attack on Search RLWE in practice.
Definition 7. Let R = (K, q, σ, s) be an RLWE instance and let q be a prime of K lying above q. The problem SRLWE(R, q) is to determine s (mod q), given access to arbitrarily many independent samples (a, b) ← R.
We recall some facts from algebraic number theory in the following lemma. Lemma 8. Let K/Q be a finite Galois extension of degree n with ring of integers R, and let q be a prime unramified in K. Then there exists a unique divisor g of n and a set of g distinct prime ideals q 1 , · · · , q g of R such that:
there is a canonical isomorphism of rings
4. the Galois group acts transitively on the ideals q 1 , . . . , q g and this action descends to an action on R q which permutes the corresponding factors in (2) in the same way.
The number f in the above lemma is called the residue degree of q in K. Note that the prime q splits completely in K if and only if its residue degree is one.
Theorem 9. Let R = (K, q, σ, s) be an RLWE instance such that K/Q is Galois of degree n and q is unramified in K with residue degree f . Let A be an oracle which solves SRLWE(R, q) using a list of m samples modulo q. Let S be a set of m RLWE samples in R q × R q . Then the problem SRLWE(R) can be solved using S by n/f calls to the oracle A , 2mn/f reductions R q → R/q, and 2mn/f evaluations of a Galois automorphism on R q .
Proof. The Galois group G = Gal(K/Q) acts on the set {q 1 , · · · , q g } transitively. Hence for each i, there exists σ i ∈ Gal(K/Q), such that σ i (q) = q i . Next, remark that σ
is itself a set of RLWE samples in R q × R q , since the action of Galois is an isometry of the Minkowski embedding. (Here it is essential that we consider only spherical Gaussians.) Furthermore, the secret for this set of samples is σ −1 i (s). Then we call the oracle A on the input (σ −1 i (S) (mod q), q). The algorithm will output σ −1 i (s) (mod q), from which we can recover s (mod q i ) using σ i . We do this for all 1 ≤ i ≤ g = n/f and use (2) of Lemma 8 to recover s.
In particular, if the number of samples m is polynomial in n and the time taken to evaluate Galois automorphisms on a single sample is also polynomial in n, then Theorem 9 gives a polynomial time reduction from SRLWE(R) to SRLWE(R, q).
Remark 10. For a proper runtime analysis of the reduction, one must examine the implementation, in particular with regards to Galois automorphisms. The runtime for evaluating an automorphism depends rather strongly on the instance and on the way ring elements are represented. For example, for subfields of cyclotomic fields represented with respect to normal integral bases, the Galois automorphisms are simply permutations of the coordinates, so the time needed to apply these automorphisms is trivial.
The search-to-decision reduction will follow from the lemma below.
Lemma 11. There is a probabilistic polynomial time reduction from SRLWE(R, q) to DRLWE(R).
Proof. This is a rephrasing of [18, Lemma 5.9 and Lemma 5.12].
Corollary 12. Suppose R is an RLWE instance where K is Galois and q is an unramified prime in K. Then there is a probabilistic polynomial-time reduction from SRLWE(R) to DRLWE(R).
The Chi-square Attack
In this section, we extend the f (1) ≡ 0 (mod q) attack of [11] and the root-of-small-order attack of [12] . These attacks can be viewed as examples of a more general principle, as follows. Suppose one has a ring homomorphism φ : R q → F where F is a finite field, and where two properties hold:
1. F is small enough that its elements can be examined exhaustively; and 2. the error distribution on R q , transported by φ to F , is detectably non-uniform.
Then the attack on decision RLWE is as follows:
2. Loop through possible guesses for the image of the secret, φ(s), in F . 3. For each guess g, compute the distribution of φ(b) − φ(a)g on the available samples. Note that if we let g * = φ(s) denote the true value,
which equals φ(e) if the guess is correct, and looks uniform otherwise. 4. If the samples are RLWE samples with secret s and g = φ(s), then this distribution will follow the error distribution, which will look non-uniform. 5. If all such distributions look uniform, then the samples were uniform, not RLWE, samples.
The fact that φ is a ring homomorphism is essential in guaranteeing that for the correct guess, the distribution in question is the image of the error distribution. The only ring homomorphisms from R q to a finite field are given by reduction modulo a prime ideal q lying above q in R.
Chi-square Test for Uniform Distribution
We briefly review the properties and usage of the chi-square test for uniform distributions over a finite set S. We partition S into r subsets S = r j=1 S j , called bins. Suppose there are M samples y 1 , . . . , y M ∈ S. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ r, we compute the expected number of samples in the j-th subset: c j := |Sj |M |S| . Then we compute the actual number of samples in S j , i.e., t j := |{1 ≤ i ≤ r : y i ∈ S j }|. Finally, the χ 2 value is computed as
Suppose the samples are drawn from the uniform distribution on S. Then the χ 2 value follows the chi-square distribution with (r − 1) degrees of freedom, which we denote by χ 2 r−1 . Let F r−1 (x) denote its cumulative distribution function. For the chi-square test, we choose a confidence level parameter α ∈ (0, 1) and compute δ = F −1 r−1 (α). Then we reject the hypothesis that the samples are drawn from the uniform distribution if χ 2 (S, y) > δ. If P, Q are two probability distributions on the set S, then their statistical distance is defined as d(P, Q) = t∈S |P (t) − Q(t)|. For convenience, we also define the l 2 distance between P and Q as
Remark 13. We chose to use the chi-square test for our attack since we are distinguishing a known distribution (uniform on R/q) from an unkown distribution (discrete Gaussians mod q). If the latter distribution is efficiently computable, then one might switch to other statistical tests, e.g., the Neyman-Pearson test, for better results.
The Chi-square Attack on SRLWE(R, q)
Let R be an RLWE instance with error distribution D Λ R ,σ and q be a prime ideal above q. The basic idea of our attack relies on the assumption that the distribution D Λ R ,σ mod q is distinguishable from the uniform distribution on the finite field F = R/q. More precisely, the attack loops through all q f possible valuess = s (mod q), and for each guess s , it computes the valuesē =b −ās (mod q) for every sample (a, b) ∈ S. If the guess is wrong, or if the samples are taken from the uniform distribution in (R q ) 2 , the valuesē would be uniformly distributed in F and it is likely to pass the chi-square test. On the other hand, if the guess is correct, then we expect the test on the errorsē to reject the null hypothesis. Let N := q f denote the cardinality of F . We remark that as a general rule of thumb for the chi-square test, we need to generate at least 5N samples.
For the attack to be successful, we need the (N − 1) tests corresponding to wrong guesses of s (mod q) to pass, and the one test corresponding to the correct guess to be rejected. For this purpose, we need to choose the confidence level α to be close enough to one (a reasonable choice is α = 1 − Theorem 15. Let R = (K, q, s, σ) be an RLWE instance. Suppose q be a prime ideal in K above q, and let ∆ denote the statistical distance between the distribution D Λ R ,σ mod q and the uniform distribution on R/q. Let M be the number of samples used in Algorithm 1, and let λ = 4M ∆ 2 . Let 0 < α < 1 and let
If p is the probability of success of the attack in Algorithm 1, then
Algorithm 1 chi-square attack on SRLWE(R, q)
Input: R = (K, q, σ, s) -an RLWE instance; R -the ring of integers of K; q -a prime ideal in K above q; F = R/q -the residue field of q; N = q f -the cardinality of F ; S -a collection of M (M = Ω(N )) RLWE samples from R; 0 < α < 1 -the confidence level. Output: a guess of the value s (mod q), or NOT-RLWE, or INSUFFICIENT-SAMPLES δ ← F
Proof. It is a standard fact (see [23] , for example) that the chi-square value on samples from D Λ R ,σ mod q follows the noncentral chi-square distribution with (N − 1) degrees of freedom and parameter λ 0 given by
Note that we have
Recall that our attack succeeds if the "error" set E from each of the (N − 1) wrong guesses of s (mod q) passes the test, and the true reduced errors fail the test. We assume that the results of these tests are independent of each other. Then the first event happens with probability α N −1 , whereas the second event has probability 1 − F N −1;λ0 (δ). Since this is an increasing function in λ 0 , we can replace λ 0 by λ, and the theorem follows.
Remark 16. One could choose the value of α in Theorem 15 to suit the specific instance. The probability of success will change accordingly. When we expect the statistical distance ∆ to be large, it is preferable to choose a larger α to increase the probability of success. For example, if we choose α = 1 − Since it requires ≈ n d /d! samples, the attack of Arora and Ge requires ≥ 10 8 samples when n ≥ 100 and d ≥ 5, for example. In contrast, the complexity of our attack depends linearly on n and quadratically on q. In particular, it does not depend on the error size (although the success rate does depend on the error size).
Vulnerable Instances among Subfields of Cyclotomic Fields
We searched for instances of RLWE vulnerable to the chi-square attack. For this purpose, we restricted attention to subfields of cyclotomic fields Q(ζ m ). Throughout this section, we assume m is a positive integer 
Remark 18. The field K m,H is totally real if and only if −1 ∈ H, in which case (r 1 , r 2 ) = (n, 0). Otherwise, it is totally complex, and (r 1 , r 2 ) = (0, n/2).
Lemma 19. Suppose R is an RLWE instance such that the underlying field K is a Galois number field and that q is unramified in K. Then the reduced error distribution D Λ R ,σ mod q is independent of the choice of prime ideal q above q.
Proof. From Lemma 8, we may switch from a prime q to q via Gal(K/Q). On the other hand, the Galois group acts on the lattice Λ R by permuting the coordinates. Hence we have a group homomorphism
Since permutation matrices are orthogonal, the Galois group action on Λ R given by φ is distance-preserving. In particular, it preserves any spherical discrete Gaussian distribution on Λ R .
Searching for Vulnerable Instances
Algorithm 1 allows us to search for vulnerable instances among fields of the form K m,H by generating actual RLWE samples and running the attack. Success of the attack will indicate vulnerability of the instance. Note that our field searching requires sampling efficiently from a discrete Gaussian D Λ,σ , for which we use the efficient algorithm developed in [14] .
In Table 3 , we list some instances on which the attack has succeeded. The columns of Table 3 are as follows. The first two columns specify m and the generators of H, where H is represented as a subgroup of (Z/mZ) * ; the column labeled f is the residue degree of q. The last column consists of either the runtime for an actual attack which succeeded, or an estimation of the runtime. Note that we omitted our choice of prime ideal q, since due to Lemma 19 the choice of q is irrelevant to our attack. The parameters σ 0 in Table 3 represent the boundary of the power of our attack, i.e., we tried higher σ 0 and the attack failed. Note that although σ 0 is relatively small, in practice it still provides exponentially many error vectors. Intuitively, when σ 0 = 1, our σ is equal to the geometric mean of the lengths of a Gram-Schmidt basis of Λ R . In practice, the lengths of these basis vectors do not differ by a lot, so we still expect to get at least Ω(2 n ) error vectors. Also, in terms of the normal integral basis of R, the coefficients of the error e are of the same size. In particular, none of the coefficients will be zero with overwhelming probability. Thus a standard linear algebra attack does not apply to this case.
The rows of Table 3 with "estimated" runtime mean the following. First, we ran the chi-square test on the correct reduced errors to obtain an estimate∆ of the statistical distance ∆. We then chose α according to∆ and obtained an estimationp of the success probability of our attack, using the formula in Theorem 15. The corresponding rows in the table all havep > 1 − 2 −10 , suggesting that the attack is very likely to succeed. Finally, we ran a few chi-square tests on samples obtained from a few randomly chosen incorrect guesses to compute the average time t for running one chi-square test. We set the estimated runtime for the attack to be tN . Remark 20. Castryk et al [7] show that there are even more weaknesses in the weak instances found in [12] so that one can attack the corresponding search RLWE problem using a standard linear algebra attack using only a few samples. The approach from [7] using linear algebra will not work on the examples in this paper. Although each coordinate of the error vector only takes on small integers, it is unlikely that any fixed coordinate of the error vector will equal to zero. Hence one can not hope to extract exact linear equations from the samples. Nonetheless, in [6] Castryck et al. performed an analysis of the instances in our Table 3 , and showed that one can recover a certain number of approximate linear equations from each RLWE sample. One can certainly run the Arora-Ge attack using these approximate equations. However, a careful analysis shows that for instances in our table, our attack is more efficient than the Arora-Ge attack.
For example, we take the first instance from Table 3 . In Section 5 of [6] , it is shown that out of each RLWE sample, one can recover 20 noisy linear equations in the secret key, with each noise sampled from a Gaussian of mean zero and standard deviation 0.5381. (In [6] , the standard deviation was incorrectly claimed to be 0.5381/ √ 2π due to a misunderstanding: they used r = 1 in their analysis but our instance has r = √ 2π.) First, we try d = 7. In order to run the Arora-Ge attack, we need in the best case ( ) ≈ 0.025. Our attack on the other hand requires 22445 samples and succeeds with probability greater than 1/2. Moreover, the computational complexity of Arora-Ge attack is cubic in the number of samples, while our attack is linear in the number of samples. Hence we conclude that our attack is more efficient. A similar analysis can be done for other instances in Table 3 .
Discussion of the Reason for Vulnerability
We searched for vulnerable instances where the modulus has residue degree one or two. It turns out that all vulnerable instances we found and listed in Table 3 have a modulus of degree two. In this section we give a heuristic explanation for the existence of examples of higher degree. Let K be a Galois number field and suppose q is a prime of residue degree f in K. We will give a scenario under which a vulnerability to our attack may appear. For the purposes of the thought experiment, we will suppose there exists a "good" integral basis w 1 , · · · , w n of the ring of integers R, by which we mean that the vectors ι(w i ) and ι(w j ) are almost orthogonal and short for i = j; this is only for convenience in the discussion. Fix a prime ideal q above q. Then the images of the basis under the reduction modulo q map are elements of F := R/q. Now if for some index i, the element w i lies inside some proper subfield K of K, and if q has residue degree f < f in K , then w i (mod q) will lie in a proper subfield of F . If this occurs for a large number of the basis elements w i , then we could expect the distribution D Λ R ,σ mod q to take values in a proper subfield of F more frequently than the uniform distribution. This would allow us to distinguish it from the uniform distribution on F .
In practice, we found that the above scenario is particularly likely when the field K has a subfield K of index 2 such that q splits completely in K and has residue degree 2 in K. Since the ring of integers of K is a subring of the ring of integers of K, one has at least n/2 linearly independent vectors in Λ R with the desired property, i.e., their reduction modulo some prime q above q lie inside F q instead of F q 2 .
A Detailed Example
In order to illustrate our discussion above together with the search-to-decision reduction, we present a vulnerable Galois instance in detail, where we generated RLWE samples, performed the attack, and used the search-to-decision reduction to recover the entire secret s.
Example 21. Let m = 3003 and H be the subgroup of (Z/mZ) * generated by 2276, 2729 and 1123. Then K = K m,H is a Galois number field of degree n = 30. We take the modulus to be q = 131, a prime of residue degree 2, and take σ 0 = 1. We generate the secret s from the discrete Gaussian D Λ R ,σ . There are 15 prime ideals in K lying above q, which we denote by q 1 , · · · , q 15 . We then generate 1000 RLWE samples and use Algorithm 1 and Theorem 9 to recover s (mod q i ) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ 15. Then we use the Chinese remainder theorem to recover s. The attack succeeded in 32.8 hours. The code for this attack is in the appendix.
6 Attacks on the Prime Cyclotomic Fields 6.1 Attacking non-dual RLWE when q = p Let p be an odd prime and let K = Q(ζ p ) be the p-th cyclotomic field. Then K has degree (p − 1) and discriminant p p−2 . The prime p is totally ramified in K, so there is a unique prime ideal p = (1 − ζ p ) above p, and the reduction from R/pR to R/pR ∼ = F p takes all powers of ζ p to 1.
We give a heuristic argument that the attack could work: writing the error e as e i ζ i m , we have e (mod p) = i e i . Since the coefficients e i tend to be small, it may be that e (mod p) takes on small values with higher probability, making the instance vulnerable to our chi-square attack. Table 4 contains data of some actual attacks we have done. Note that the parameters σ 0 represent the boundary of the power of our attack in practice, i.e., we tried higher σ 0 and the attack failed. 
Attacking dual RLWE
We adopt our attack to the decision version of dual RLWE for the field K = Q(ζ p ), with no assumptions on the modulus q. Keep the notations as above, and let R ∨ be the dual ideal of R. Let r > 0 be the width parameter. Then the error e is sampled from the continuous spherical Gaussian distribution of width r, which is denoted D r in [18] . Recall that the secret s ∈ R ∨ /qR ∨ , and an RLWE sample is (a, b = as + e) ∈ R q × K R /qR ∨ . We start by scaling the second coordinate by p. Then b = bp = a(ps) + pe. Using the fact that pR ∨ = p, we see that s = ps ∈ p/qp, and e = pe ∈ K R /qp. Thus we can regard s as the new secret, and e as the new error.
Note that the scaled error e = pe is sampled from the continuous spherical Gaussian D pr . Equivalently, by [10] , we may assume e is sampled as
where the coefficients e i are i.i.d. one-dimensional Gaussians with width √ pr.
Recall that our goal is to tell the difference between the above samples and samples chosen uniformly from R q × K R /qp. Let β = ζ p − 1. Note that K = Q(β), hence every element in K R can be uniquely written as
It is clear that ρ is additive. We examine the image of e under the map ρ. We write
Then one verfies that 0 = e 0 + · · · + e p−2 − (p − 1)e p−1 and we have ρ(e) = 0 . Now we make two observations: first, since the ideal p is generated by β, we have ρ(p) = pZ; second, we have as = a(p · s) ∈ p/qp. Combining these observations, we see that
We could describe our attack on the decision RLWE as follows: for each scaled sample (a, b ), we compute ρ(b ). Then we perform a statistical test on the set {ρ(b ) mod pZ} ⊆ R/pZ to distinguish it from the uniform distribution on the circle R/pZ.
Note that this attack did not involve the modulus q, thus it can be applied to any modulus. This is in contrast to the previous attack on the non-dual case, where the attack was only performed under the assumption that q = p is the unique ramified prime.
Remark 22. The search-to-decision reduction for dual RLWE in cyclotomic fields and completely split modulus is proved in [18] . However, the theorem requires that the error width r ≥ η (R ∨ ) for some negligible = (n). (Here η (R ∨ ) is the smoothing parameter defined in [19] . For R = Z[ζ p ], if we take = 2 −p+1 , then one sees that η (R ∨ ) ≤ 1, and η (R ∨ ) tends to 1 in the limit as p → ∞). Hence the search-to-decision reduction of [18] essentially requires r ≥ 1, which is above the parameters we can attack (r ∼ 1/ √ p). So in this particular case, our attack on the decision problem cannot be transferred to an attack on the search problem using this search-to-decision reduction. Table 5 records some successful attacks. Note that we have omitted the modulus q since it is irrelevant to the attack. We used 50∼400 bins for the chi-square tests. We observe from the table that the error width we can attack is about a constant times 1/ √ p, and that the constant is growing (if slowly) as p grows. The modulus switching procedure is a technique to reduce noise in RLWE samples, and has been discussed extensively in [3] and [16] . We recap the basic ideas of modulus switching. Let R = (K, q, σ, s) be an RLWE instance. Choose another prime p less than q as the new modulus and consider the instance R = (K, p, σ , s) for some σ > σ. We can "switch modulus" if there exists a map
which takes RLWE samples with respect to R to RLWE samples with respect to R . In what follows, we give a heuristic argument that our attack will not work in combination with modulus switching under a naïve implementation, and isolate the key characteristics a successful implementation of the attack would require. One example of a map π q,p being used in practice is as follows. Let α = p q and fix a small positive number τ . For an equivalence class [a] in R q , we sample a vector a from the "shifted discrete Gaussian" D Λ R ,τ,αa , defined as follows. For a lattice Λ and a vector c ∈ R n ,
Finally, we set π q,p ([a]) = a (mod pR). Note that the definition of π q,p ([a]) is independent of the choice of representative a, as follows. Suppose we choose another representative a 1 , then a 1 = a + λq for some λ ∈ R, hence αa 1 = αa + λp. Finally, observe that the shifted discrete Gaussian behaves well under translating by a lattice point, i.e., we have D Λ,τ,c+u = D Λ,τ,c + u for any u ∈ Λ. Put loosely, the map π q,p scales a by p/q and then rounds back into the lattice. It is a natural question then to ask whether modulus switching can be combined with our attack, to switch from a "strong" modulus to a "weak" modulus. However, a heuristic argument shows that the naive combination of our attack with modulus switching will not work.
Let a = αa − a . By construction, we expect a to be a short vector in R n , and the point a can be viewed as a "rounding" of the point αa to the lattice Λ R .
We will make two heuristic assumptions:
1. That π q,p takes the uniform distribution on R q to an almost uniform distribution on R p . 2. The distribution of b and (sa) is independent modulo q, for s = ±1.
Proposition 23. Under the assumption that π q,p takes the uniform distribution on R q to an almost uniform distribution on R p , the reduction of a modulo p will be almost uniformly distributed in R/pR.
Proof. The reduction map R → R/p is a ring homomorphism that can be extended to a homomorphism of additive groups φ : 1 q R → R/p by the following chain of maps:
Then the relation a + a = αa is preserved by this map. However, φ(αa) = 0 (mod p), so that φ(a ) ≡ −φ(a ). By the Proposition above, a and b are uniformly distributed modulo p. Hence, if we assume the a and b are independent, then the reduced rounding errors a (mod p) and b (mod p) are also independent, and the new reduced errors e (mod p) would follow the uniform distribution. So our chi-square attack will fail on these modulus-switched samples, even though p might be a "weak" modulus.
Therefore, the best hope of attack is if one of our two assumptions is violated by a map π q,p . The second is the most likely target. Note that a and b are the rounding errors when we try to round αa and αb to the lattice Λ R . However, Λ R is a n-dimensional lattice, so there are Ω(2 n ) options of rounding a vector in R n to a moderately close lattice point. Even in the scenario with zero error, i.e., e = 0, an attacker will face the task of finding a "nice" rounding algorithm, so that the roundings of the two vectors αa and αb = αas are somehow related.
So far, we are not aware of any such algorithm, unless the secret s is trivial, e.g., s = 1, in which case αa is almost equal to αb, and one expects that a is close to b . 
MyLatticeSampler.sage
This file allows sampling from discrete lattice Gaussian distributions using the algorithm in [14] . It took the current implementation in sage and modified it slightly to fix some issues. The authors claim no originality of any code in this file. nLarge +=1 card = q**degF eLarge= float(eltsWithFullDegree/card*numsamples) eSmall= numsamples -eLarge verbose('eSmall, eLarge = %s,%s'%(eSmall, eLarge)) verbose('nSmall, nLarge = %s,%s'%(nSmall, nLarge)) if min(eSmall, eLarge) < 5:
raise ValueError('samples size too small.') chisquare = (nSmall -eSmall )^2/eSmall + (nLarge -eLarge)^2/eLarge T = RealDistribution('chisquared', 1) verbose('chisquare = %s'%chisquare) prob = 1 -T.cum_distribution_function(chisquare) if prob < probThreshold: verbose('non-uniform') return False else:
verbose('uniform') return True
Example of an attack
This code implements the attack on an Galois RLWE instance described in Section 5.3.
